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WAR AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN MALAYSIA:
THE STATE OF THE ART

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WAR AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN MALAYSIA:
THE STATE OF THE ART

by

Zakaria Haji Ahmad
Department of Political Science
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia

INTRODUCTION

The general subject-area or field of study designated as war and/or conflict studies is a burgeoning newcomer in the institutions of higher learning in Malaysia. Although interest in the subject is not new and can be said to have been extant all along among those involved in the profession of arms, its recent impetus is related to greater official concern with regional security and defence issues made poignant with the Communist victories in 1975 in Vietnam and Laos and other post-1975 developments in Indochina, especially the 1978 irruption of Kampuchea by Vietnam, and a perceived United States withdrawal from Southeast Asia.[1] Among those advocating or teaching war and conflict studies, however, there is considerable anxiety, disagreement and even confusion as to its scope, content and direction. But this ferment, significantly enough, occurs in an atmosphere of apparent consensus on the need for such a subject as a field of study. In the remainder of this paper, I discuss the issues emanating from the teaching and research of war and conflict studies in Malaysia, with specific reference to its role in the process of military education.

NOTIONS OF 'STRATEGIC STUDIES'

Narrowly defined, war and conflict studies have to do with issues of national security in the conventional sense of defence against external aggression and the problems of international tension and conflict resolution. More broadly defined, the canvas of such a field extends to encompass a large range of topics and areas of discussion, such as (for example) the role of religion in the fabric of a body-politic and, especially important in a country like Malaysia, the numerous aspects of counter-insurgency operations. The latter instance is really an internal defence issue and, as such, indicates an 'unconventional' approach to the study of conflict. There is, in addition, an element of war/conflict studies which is important to the practitioner of war and this pertains to the more 'operational' questions of strategy, tactics, command and control and communications[C3], and staff functions considered necessary in the running of modern military.

It could of course be assumed that war and conflict studies relate only to that area in the field of international relations known as 'strategic studies'. Within the Malaysian military, there are two formulations in the curriculum approach for middle-ranking and senior officers. At the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College (MAFSC)[2], the aim of such studies is to

- (a) develop an appreciation of the fundamental concepts of strategic thinking, and
- (b) provide the means for the application of strategic thinking to defence problems and strategy.[3]

At the higher level Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College (MPAT), the objective seems more analytical than applied, as indicated in the statement:

Hopefully, the end result would be for officers to have a broader understanding of the political processes in military decisions as to understand their limitations and constraints.[4]

Yet a third formulation may be said to exist in that an introduction to war studies with discussions on the nature of war, the principles of warfare, etc., is an ingredient in officer training. Such studies, however, are offered at the junior officer or subaltern level.

The extent and content as well as purpose of these formulations signify two broad areas of concern or understanding to the military: first, conceptual and theoretical knowledge about war and conflict both in terms of its external and internal dimensions; and, second, the operational or more professionally relevant aspects (i.e., tactics).

In terms of definitions, military institutions have preferred to use 'war studies' to denote the field at hand whilst the civilian institutions, though using the term 'strategic' and/or 'security' studies, would seem to prefer the term 'conflict' in their conceptualization of the core concern of the field. Although 'strategic studies' is increasingly superseding 'war studies' in the lexicon of the military's staff colleges, it is apparent that the latter term is related to the military's understanding of the subject as related to combat, and as such is probably a more down-to-earth notion of the subject than what the former term connotes.

It is evident from the foregoing that one of the issues in the teaching of war/conflict studies in Malaysia is the scope of the subject-matter. Given the limitations of experience and expertise, civilian institutions of higher learning have not been able to offer the more professional element of military tactics and other similar aspects in course syllabi. This is not to suggest that important topics like 'recent advances in tank warfare technology' are precluded from being discussed in the universities, but very definitely combat formation drills, shooting skills and the like are rarely considered appropriate academic problem-areas. For the military institutions teaching war studies, however, the emphasis is either overwhelmingly 'operational tactics' in nature or an apparent gap exists in their capacity to teach more theoretically relevant matters such as 'conflict resolution', at least as understood in scholastic terms.

Although in both the civilian and military centres of learning the thrust of their programmes have been more broad-based rather than narrowly defined, a gap has arisen in the perceived usefulness of each offering. This problem is more acute from a military perspective since the circumstances of Malaysia's armed forces dictate a more 'combat' approach to the understanding of warfare, the need for a combined

capability in conventional and unconventional missions and the restricted scope of assignment and career development of the officer corps of what is essentially a comparatively small army. Indeed, an issue which has recently surfaced is whether the staff college (MTAT) should reduce the teaching of staff duties and functions and devote its attention to tactical subjects, a concern apparently justified in the light of deterioration in officer quality due to rapid expansion in the late 1970s.

Whilst it is clear that the civilian academic institutions will not offer a strategic studies programme to produce officers or students with brilliant tactical knowledge, it is not apparent if the curriculum content at tertiary institutions constitutes a subject-matter that enhances an understanding of the factors and issues germane to defence planning, organisation and related matters. Indeed, it would seem that offerings in the social sciences are being made but that their utility can be questioned, which has led in effect to a criticism that they were too 'basic'.

THE CENTRES OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

At this juncture, it is necessary to identify the centres of learning which offer programmes in war/conflict studies. This is meant to exclude those institutions which do not offer such programmes per se, as a course on 'international relations' (as offered at the University of Malaya) could conceivably be considered relevant to the field. In the military domain, two centres offer such programmes, namely the Armed Forces Staff College (MTAT) and the Armed Forces Defence College (MPAT). The former began in 1972 and the latter only in 1981. A third, even higher-level armed forces college, the National Defence College, will be set up in the not-too-distant future. In the civilian sector, war/conflict studies programmes are offered at Universiti Kebangsaan ('National University of Malaysia' or UKM) and the Universiti Sains ('Science University or USM), in Penang. War studies modules are taught as well at other military training centres, namely the Royal Military College (RMC) at Sungei Besi and the Officer Cadet School (OCS) at Port Dickson, but it is the programmes at MTAT and MPAT that are really germane to the discussion here.

The objectives of the four programmes under scrutiny constitute a major issue in the study of war/conflict, not as much as to their differences but more as to the level of attainment to be realized by those taking the courses. As such, comparisons may be invalid insofar as the programmes have different contents because of different end-goals.

THE MILITARY CENTRES

In the case of the MTAT, its charter states that the course is intended 'to develop intellectual depth and analytical capability of selected officers so as to enable them to have a comprehensive understanding in the conduct of operations and in the management of service resources'.^[5] Over a period of 45 weeks, the MTAT course covers eight study-areas, each with specific objectives. These eight study-groups are:

- a) Profession of Arms and Services Study
- b) General Staff Study
- c) Operations of War Study /i)
- d) KESBAN # Study
- e) Administration Study
- f) Strategic Study
- g) Naval Elective Study) counted as one
- h) Air Force Elective Study) study-group
- i) Exercises and Research

In terms of allocation of time spent in each segment or study-group of the MPAT course, the breakdown is as shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1: ALLOCATION OF PERIODS FOR 'STUDY-GROUPS'
AT THE ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE, MALAYSIA, 1981*

Study-group	Periods**	%
1. Profession of Arms and Services	143	13.06
2. General Staff Study	170	15.53
3. Operations of War Study	309	28.22
4. KESBAN # Study	132	12.05
5. Administration Study	246	22.47
6. Strategic Study	95	8.68
Total***	1,095	100.01***
7. Exercises and Research	326	-
8. Miscellaneous	174	-

* Does not include periods for Air Force/Naval elective studies.

** Each period is about 40 minutes duration.

*** Omits 'Exercises and Research' and 'Miscellaneous'.

**** To nearest decimal.

KESBAN is an acronym derived from the Malay words 'keselamatan' ('security') and 'pembangunan' ('development').

Source: Syllabus, Armed Forces Staff College, Malaysia.

Inasmuch as 'strategic studies' is understood in the conventional academic sense of understanding the concepts and problem-areas of the study of international relations, it would appear that only 63 hours are spent on the subject; this is about only 8.7 per cent of the total time spent on the six study-groups (apart from 'exercises and research' and 'miscellaneous') of the MPAT. Of course, if the other study-groups are important not only in the operational sense but also in the sense of understanding 'war', then the student at the MPAT would appear to be getting a more than fair grounding in war/conflict studies.

In addition, there is a significant war/conflict content in the emphases on war-related areas which are germane to an understanding of Malaysia's national security. From Figure 1 it is seen that the amount of time devoted to KESBAN is 12 per cent of the total of the period for six study-groups. For Malaysia, which is still carrying out counter-insurgency operations, the KESBAN proportion is important and as

such can be considered to provide the substantive knowledge about war and conflict to the MPAT student. Counting both the KESBAN and strategic study-groups, a good 21 per cent of time is spent on theoretical elements of security matters which, when supplemented by the time spent on the 'operational knowledge' study-groups, would reinforce the belief in the academic value of the MPAT course.

On this point, the Malaysian military have been insistent that the MPAT offers a truly professional course and one which could be considered equivalent to no less than a bachelor's degree from any of the country's civilian universities. This point would seem to be valid if it is taken into consideration that two major papers are prepared by MPAT's students on topics of international relations and national security as part of their course. However, such a recognition would need to have the assent of the academic community, which has to date not been willing to concede the status of the MPAT course as equivalent to the first-degree programmes of the universities. It is argued that the MPAT course is more geared for the profession of arms and services, is less academically demanding and simply not comparable in standard to academic programmes. Additionally, the quality of the papers presented at the MPAT leaves much to be desired in terms of academic rigour and a theoretical contribution to knowledge.

As opposed to the one-year course duration at the MPAT, the MPAT for lieutenant-colonels and above (or their equivalent) has only a six months programme. Being a higher-level staff college, there is more emphasis on discussion and research on matters related to issues in national defence, national development and regional and global questions. From a military standpoint, course participants are introduced to the planning and management aspects of the military rather than to 'staff' subjects. From a strategic studies viewpoint, 'the course will attempt to unravel the relationship between strategy and government policies.[6] Appropriate subject-areas raised for intensive discussion include higher defence organisation and manpower studies,[7] research on topics of domestic, regional and international importance, the capabilities and structure of the armed forces, and specialised or in-depth investigations into the varying needs of the armed forces such as submarine acquisition, air defence, and army reorganisation.[8] In addition, a 'special study' of a selected topic of outstanding national interest is being offered, for the first time, in 1983.[9]

The MPAT offering has raised little debate regarding course recognition or even the suitability or relevance of course content, but this has been due more to the fact that no approach has been made to compare its programme with those in the universities. The academic community shows little appreciation of the quality of the military's strategic studies programmes.

The military have sought to overcome some of the problems mentioned above by attempting a more systematic approach to the study of war and by forging liaisons and linkages with the academic community. MPAT, since its inception, has been utilising university staff members to give lectures on selected topics and in the assessment of students' written exercises. At the MPAT, an academic has been a 'permanent fixture' of the Directing Staff (DS), with specific responsibility for a 'strategic studies/international relations' module.

Changes have been made to the basic assumptions of the strategic studies offerings at the MTAT and MPAT, but several issues persist. Both the MTAT and MPAT strategic studies modules are similar in certain respects, although there is no teaching content in the latter. But there is no continuity between the two offerings nor an appreciation of the extent of knowledge of each particular course gained by its participants. Nonetheless, in that students are exposed to quite a number of panel discussions and lectures by outside speakers (academics and leading private and public figures in various capacities of expertise), it would seem that knowledge of current affairs in the country, the region and the world is enhanced. In addition, it may be noted that various projects organised on a syndicate basis at the MTAT and MPAT would seem to highlight an understanding of the complex relationships and processes in the areas of national defence and security. But on the whole, the academic rating of strategic studies at MTAT and MPAT is yet to be established.

THE ACADEMIC CENTRES

How do strategic studies programmes fare in the universities? Although both USM and UKM offer such programmes and the University of Malaya is also interested in hosting an offering - only the UKM programme has been firmly established.

The Strategic and Security Studies programme at UKM was initiated with a request that the university offer studies of the nature so that the military's Reserve Officers' Training Unit (ROTU), also recently established, could take courses with an academic approach to complement their more combat or physically-relevant courses in military training. However, in terms of implementation, due to a variety of problems, only a small proportion of ROTU students have been able to take courses from this programme. On the other hand, the UKM programme has taken off on a scale larger than initially expected, with the end result offered being that of a 'diploma' (but equivalent only to the first year of university) for its participants.

The diploma in Strategic and Security Studies at UKM runs over two semesters (roughly 30 weeks) and is equivalent to 30 academic units (1 unit is equivalent to 1 contact-hour). The programme is divided into core and elective courses, worth 15 units in each component. The core courses for 1983-84 are as shown in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2: CORE COURSES IN STRATEGIC AND SECURITY STUDIES
PROGRAMME, UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA 1983-84

Course Title	Unit Value
1. Introduction to Strategic and Security Studies	3
2. Seminar: Issues in Defence and Security	3
3. Southeast Asian Political Systems	3
or	
International Relations of Southeast Asia	
4. Introduction to Malaysian Politics	3
or	
Malaysian History X (Post-1941)	
5. Jihad ('Holy War'): Theory and Practice	3
Total	<u>15</u>

Source: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 'Regulations Concerning the Diploma in Strategic and Security Studies', Handbook of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities 1983-84, pp.213-214.

For the remainder of the fifteen units, course participants are required to select a three-unit course which is mandatory (called a 'guided elective'); courses selected from the Faculty of Social Sciences are valued up to six units and courses from other faculties are valued up to six units. Alternatively, students could opt to write a project paper valued at three units, take the guided elective course, a course valued up to three units from the Faculty of Social Sciences, and courses from other faculties valued up to six units. The 'guided elective' course is titled 'Economics of Defence and Security'. [10]

As the UKM diploma course is offered only for serving officers of the armed forces and the police, a difference in the elective menu has been specified, beginning from the 1983 course, for these personnel. Thus, courses such as 'comparative police systems' and 'police-public relations' are highly recommended electives for police officers. [11] The armed forces also have a specific list but there are no courses directly concerned with studies of the armed forces such as, for example, civil-military relations.

According to the prospectus of UKM's Strategic and Security Studies programme, its aims or objectives are to:

- a) study and develop knowledge relating to strategy and security, including that of the military,
- b) offer courses relating to strategy, security and the military to enable students to upgrade their understanding and awareness of these areas,
- c) upgrade knowledge and awareness in the fields of strategy, security and that of the military among military and police personnel and others, and

- d) produce military/police officers with wide knowledge, discipline and 'firmness in spirit'. [12]

Although the UKM's programme objectives have remained intact, assessments made of its contents have resulted in changes. It soon became evident that the core programme of the original syllabus (as shown in Figure 3) was unsatisfactory and indeed even irrelevant for a strategic studies course. In retrospect, the design of the earlier curriculum was too much a response to the 'demands' made by the university's faculties. The body responsible for the programme's implementation, the Faculty of Social Sciences, has subsequently had to restructure it so that it became more a broadly defined social sciences one.

FIGURE 3: CORE COURSES IN STRATEGIC AND SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAMME
UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA, 1981-82

Course Title	Unit Value
1. Theory and Practice of Islamic 'Holy War' ('Jihad')	2
2. Islam and the Theory and Practice of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism	3
3. Issues in Defence and Security	4
4. Malaysian History After 1941	3
5. Any Other Course Apart from those Offered from Departments of History and Political Science and the Faculty of Islamic Studies	3
Total	15

Source: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Program Pengajian Strategi dan Keselamatan ('Strategic and Security Studies Programme') 1981/82, p.9.

UKM's programme has been considered very important to the Malaysian police who have had 44 of their officers taking the diploma course and who have found the programme generally adequate and satisfying. After some hesitation, the Malaysian military began participating in June 1982.

It can be said that the UKM course is not concerned with the operational needs of the military but would appear to offer aspects of the field that should enhance the professional soldier's understanding of the socio-political environment he would be operating in. Even with regard to police needs, in which respect there had been adequate consultations between UKM and the police authorities, the programme's concerns are more with societal matters than with specific service needs (for example, nothing is taught on the science of deployment of Police patrol vehicles, although a course is offered on 'Comparative Police Systems'). In the process of re-thinking and re-formulating the contents of the UKM programme more in line with the needs of its clientele, the focus has shifted toward national and regional contexts

of security and basic issues of defence and security. However, it is not clear if there is a unifying thread between all the offerings that makes the UKM strategic studies package attractive enough to Malaysia's security services so that it is a viable proposition.

At USM, the strategic studies module had been planned for the ROTU training programme in order to fulfil the latter's 'war studies' component. Run by the School of Comparative Social Sciences, courses on strategic studies have been offered since 1980/81. ROTU students were required to obtain between 16 and 20 academic units, with the courses titled 'Military Doctrines' and 'Selected Issues In Peace Research' being compulsory. However, due to administrative problems, only the former course has really been offered (by the same academic who had been seconded to the MPAT as the IS for Strategic Studies). Elective courses, however, are still available, such as 'Public Opinion' and 'Role of the Big Powers in Southeast Asia', but on the whole the war studies component has been difficult to implement. In effect, USM's other plan to offer this component also as a 'strategic studies' sub-discipline (with a few other additional requirements) within the Social Sciences School has also been inoperative. As a result, only UKM has been able to offer an ongoing war/conflict studies programme.

ISSUES AND FUTURE TRENDS

Insofar as any field of study should enhance knowledge, it is imperative to ask two questions about the war and conflict studies programmes now being offered. First, what has been the net gain for the student taking such programmes, and, second, are the practitioners of the art (and here we mean those responsible for the teaching functions) furthering knowledge about the complex questions about national security?

No hard empirical data exist to enable a firm answer to the first question but it would appear that the programmes offered by the military have been useful in upgrading knowledge about war (the theoretical and conceptual aspects, even if basic) and operational concerns to their own personnel. But as has already been noted, a recent review of the MPAT programme suggested a lessening of the strategic study-group and a corresponding increase in learning about military tactics and operations. In turn, it has been proposed that 'strategic studies' should receive more emphasis at the MPAT.

An understanding of the myriad aspects and issues about national security, however, would require an introduction to more academically higher-level courses that only the universities could provide. Here, it would seem, the universities have not as yet come up to the challenge. And both at the military staff schools and the universities, that which passes for 'strategic studies' is either too Western-oriented in conceptualization or so general as would seem to stretch the meaning of 'strategic' way past its parameters. At the MPAT, for example, there is considerable justification for making its students aware of the intricacies of defence planning in Malaysia, but the political considerations impinging on security issues do not approximate the kind of theoretical constructs existing in the US and European contexts.^[13] Malaysian military and police officers may well be acutely aware of the kind of cultural and political contexts in which they operate, but it is

less clear if these cognitions allow for analytical and theoretical understanding of these issues or even if they are germane for officer education.

On the other hand, the strategic studies programme at UKM has been considered adequate and satisfactory for students coming from the police, but the level of the work is 'heavy' in terms of the load. This finding is interesting since the professional interests of the police are perhaps served better by the more 'general' courses rather than, say, courses on the strategic options of the Soviets and the Chinese in Southeast Asia.

Apropos the reading material of the more 'strategic' elements of war and conflict studies, and indeed the epistemological foundations of the field, both the universities and the military staff colleges display a literature list that has originated almost entirely from the United States and Britain. As such, then, nuclear strategy which is useful to know about but useless in the security considerations of Malaysia and Southeast Asia, gets a top billing in the reading lists, whereas erudite or profound assessments about security questions at national or regional level are simply non-existent. Thus, for example, 'the political considerations in the process of defence planning in Malaysia' is conceivably an important topic but has not been investigated in a systematic, scholastic and profound manner, and therefore debilitates the process of instruction and pedagogy.

In part, this situation is contained in the answer to the second question. The academic community concerned with security questions is a mere handful and as such has had to extend its limits in offering members' expertise. As already alluded to above, epistemological characteristics of what could be considered 'Malaysian national security' are also lacking and would take time to develop. But, as a result, what could pass for knowledge to be transmitted to those wanting to learn in depth about war and conflict is either too basic or lacking in theoretical sophistication and substantive scholarship as well as in an indigenous approach to the field.

Finally, to compound the situation on war and conflict studies, there clearly exists a dichotomy in approach to the subject between the military and the universities. Although both have recognised the need for such a subject, each thinks it is more knowledgeable than the other. To some extent, the level of knowledge is a function of the prevailing situation of secrecy that shrouds discussion about security and defence, but scholarship is not impossible.

From the academic side, there has been a tendency, almost supercilious, to the effect that theoretical knowledge at the university level is far superior to what could be offered or taught in the military colleges. To an extent, a prejudice exists amongst scholars that the military is mainly brawn and lacking in brains. It is noteworthy as well that two attempts to obtain accreditation of the MPAT course as equivalent to a first degree from the Universiti Sains and Universiti Kebangsaan have failed. Conversely, the military have not as yet been absolutely willing to believe that the universities are a credible repository of knowledge about military matters. Neither is it clear that strategic studies is valued for its worth - in the MPAT, for example, it is reported that the field is included in the curriculum

'not so much for its intrinsic merits as an intellectual pursuit, but to enhance course members' comprehension of the many factors which affect decision-making for the formulation of defence thoughts and plans'.[14]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

These differences notwithstanding, however, there have been meetings by both sides to reach an understanding over the bases of war and conflict studies. Indeed, the military have been most willing to invite staff from the universities to give lectures and other help in the military staff colleges. Interest has also been raised about the possibility that the universities will be able to offer a strategic studies programme at the post-graduate level. There is common ground that is still to be demarcated in helping to develop the field into a fully fledged one.

At the same time, however, more research will have to be conducted and the results published to achieve a high state of the art in war and conflict studies. There are indications that this is not an altogether insurmountable task, and already there are instances of academic output in that direction.[15] But, at present, knowledge is only putative and data are lacking. As instances of this situation, we know very little about the conduct and problems regarding trans-border operations, the issues with respect to defence spending (is it cost-effective?), the ability of the army to perform both conventional and unconventional missions, the capabilities of the reserve forces, the role of the Malaysian equivalent of a home guard (RELA), changing patterns and socialisation of the officer corps and a host of other topics. It would probably be correct to assert that war and conflict programmes are on-going but their content may be more an exposition of theoretical issues than analysis of the actual situation in the country in terms of the above questions.

In the end, it may well be that issues concerning defence and security and their analysis comprise a matter that is reserved for a select few and the appropriate government departments.[16] But, inasmuch as there appears to be a broadening of the audience through the dispersal of war and conflict studies beyond military institutions, there is an opportunity created to expand knowledge and discussion about the field to both practitioners and theoreticians alike.

ENDNOTES

1. For a discussion of the perceived US role in Southeast Asia, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 'The US Military: The View from Southeast Asia', in Sam Sarkesian (ed.), The US Military: The View from Abroad, forthcoming.
2. Hereafter, the Malay abbreviations will be used. The Armed Forces Defence College abbreviation is 'MPAT'.
3. Malaysia, Armed Forces Staff College documents, not dated.
4. Malaysia, Armed Forces Defence College, 'Strategic Studies Module', p.1.
5. As in footnote 3.
6. Malaysia, Armed Forces Defence College, 'Strategic Studies Module', p.1.
7. For the 1983 course, contained in special directives of the MPAT.
8. All subsumed under the 'Tilik Series and Beresatu Teguh' directives of the MPAT.
9. For the 1983 MPAT course, a discussion of Islam as an aspect of the Malaysian government's policies.
10. Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 'Regulations Concerning the Diploma in Strategic and Security Studies', Panduan Fakulti Sains Kemasyarakatan dan Kemanusiaan ('Handbook of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, 1983-84), pp.214-216.
11. Ibid. pp.214-216.
12. Ibid., p.212.
13. Even for a country like the Federal Republic of Germany, it is not clear if the very process of decision-making in security policy is definable. See E.W. Gohlert, 'An Organisational Perspective on German National Security Policy', in Frank B. Horton, et. al., (eds), Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp.146-155.
14. Malaysia, Armed Forces Staff College document.
15. See M. Pathmanathan, 'Malaysian Defence Policy: The Phasing Out of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement', paper presented at the 8th Conference of Historians of Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 25-29 August, 1980; Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysian Defence Policy (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1980); Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 'The Military in Malaysia: Institution-Building of a Force Subserving to Civilian Authorities', in H. Crouch and Zakaria Haji Ahmad, (eds.), Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press), forthcoming.

16. For a discussion of this theme, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 'The Challenges to Malaysian National Security', in M. Taib Osman, (ed.), Malaysia Comes of Age, forthcoming.
17. UKM's Strategic Studies Programme actually initiated a seminar series on security and defence issues in 1982. However, the series is not a regularised affair.