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# MALAYSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING AHEAD, OR, LOOKING OUTWARDS AND MOVING INWARDS?

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## INTRODUCTION

After thirty years of independence, it might well be expected that a level of maturity has been attained in national policy-making and policy implementation in both the domestic and foreign sectors of the Malaysian nation-state. This observation, however, is valid only to a limited extent, since the policy of any country is the outcome of a complex interplay of factors, an axiom that is universally tenable and applicable to a young, developing country like Malaysia as it is to very much older nation-states such as those in Europe. The "level of maturity" that one presupposes, therefore, is obtained insofar as there is less likelihood of discontinuities in the planks of policy, where the impact of idiosyncretic factors is more an aberration rather rather than a given, and wherein the professionalization of career diplomats provide the basis of the conduct of inter-state relations according to well-trodden paths and "correct" or conventional international behavior. This leads to yet another important factor of international politics - that the conduct of foreign policy by any one state is carried out at the level of national states, a unit of analysis that can be expected to persist for a considerable period of time to come.

In the travails of national states that achieved independence from colonialism in the aftermath of the Second World War, the dramas of the concomitant challenges of social, political and economic development have been well documented and analysed, but a striking gap in our knowledge is our understanding of how these nation-states respond to the problems of inter-state interaction as a function of policy-making from <u>within</u> a country's domestic establishment and process.

This observation is related to the linkage theories of the study of international relations, but what is emphasized here is that it is less known of the interface between the needs and dynamics of foreign policy and the imperatives of national development. On the one hand, a foreign policy is putatively the mirror of the domestic political environment, but on the other the external environment of the international system may have just an important an impact on the road after independence.

Three possible scenarios may be postulated in the approach to balance the needs of the nation-state according to domestic demands and the existence of the state in the international domain. The first is the Burma example in which a state decides to isolate itself and shun the influences of the outside world. The second is the use of foreign policy to bolster and buffet a regime from domestic challenges, such as was carried out by Indonesia in the Sukarno era. The third is to seek a balance between the needs of the domestic sector against that of a foreign policy to guarantee a state's survival and existence in an international system that is actually assymeterical. In practice, of course, some combinations of these three modalities is usually pursued.

Nothwithstanding the validity of the above, the contradictory truth of the matter is that the nation-state is an anachronistic notion that is no longer tenable in an interdependent world, even as the myth of the nation as the political community sui generis continues to be the prevailing concept in the domestic political arena. In an age of rapid technological advances and the information revolution, the parameters of national survival in the international system recognises no longer the validity of "national borders" - physical, social, economic and political. If this premise is correct, nation-states

still faced with nation-building are doomed in the vortex of domestic quagmire if its location in the international time-space is not seen as the imperative of foreign policy. The quintessential problem, then, is the ability to reconcile the tug between what appears to be an increasingly complex and highly nationalistic domestic political context and the foreign policy of the challenge of competitiveness in a global environment that is more interconnected among its parts and will be more so in time to come.

These considerations provide the context in which one may want to analyze and intepret Malaysian foreign policy. What can be extrapolated for the future based on past and present foreign policy? What are the constraints and what are the opportunities of foreign policy? What is Malaysia's role in regional and global affairs? These questions in turn raise other issues. How does Malaysia identify itself in the international environment? How should or would it respond to the likely configuration of the the regional and international arenas of competition, influence, rivalry, cooperation and other aspects of inter-state behaviour?

Nonetheless, the well-known cliche that "every nation has no permanent enemies nor permanent friends, but only permanent interests" may well nullify any attempt, however, well-intentioned, at an appraisal of Malaysia's future foreign policy directions from the retrospective vantage point. What may then be thematic in the Malaysian context is that there has been a sense of prgamatism that has prevailed against any idealism that may be professed. That in itself may be a function of the strong impact of individuals who have played key roles in the formation of foreign policy - assuming there is one, necessitating as such the need to delve into the ruling elite's predispositions. But it can be observed at the outset that the shifts in foreign policy are essentially between

idealism and pragmatism - the latter a trait of the early post-Merdeka years and the latter characteristic of the 1980s. In this manner, Malaysia's foreign policy may well be one that is actually in flux.

At the same time, however, these two polar opposites represent a dilemma in foreign policy that is apparent, since they also pose the challenge of the interface between domestic and international needs that have already been alluded to. Whilst Malaysia regards itself as part of the Third World, its level of socio-economic development places it in the league of a soon-to-be NIC. It may identify with the 'South', but Malaysia is more a 'North' country. The greater the country aspires to 'arrive', the more international it needs to be; on the other hand, domestic developments with an increasingly nationalistic flavour indicate a trend that is more inward-looking. As such, even as the rhetoric expressed is looking outwards, domestically it is a country actually moving inwards. One should expect, therefore, contradictions in foreign policy between the facts and policy objectives.

Two other observations may be in order. Qua nation-state, Malaysia with a heterogeneous population mix and a territory divided physically has had a more arduous task in establishing an identity that allows for a great or easier identification in the international arena. Its survival challenge thus far has been more internal but within the context of a regional Malay milieu, it is less clear if it is a Malay state or a Malay-dominant, multi-racial country. The advent of Islamic revivalism has only accentuated this less-talked-about issue, though the challenge of the former in a Westernized international system is not necessarily irreconcilable.(1) The second is the ability to modernize and compete in an interdependent world simultaneous with the demands of

its increasingly politicized and socially-aware citizenry for greater participation in the system.(2) In the years ahead, Malayysian foreign policy may well be an item of public debate and scrutiny rather than one determined by a select officialdom and heretofore closed domain.

Foreign Policy: An Overview

In his study of Malaysia's foreign policy, J. Saravanamuttu identifies four sources of foreign policy, that is, the inputs or independent variables. These are (i) "eco-historical", which features attributes as history, culture, geography and the like; (ii) "external" sources which emanate from the external environment; (iii) "internal" sources which refer to the domestic inputs; and (iv) "idiosyncretic" sources in the form of individual or personality traits of its policy-makers.(3) Although the "eco-historical" and "internal" sources are similar, the former is more permanent in nature and the latter more transitory. Amonth the ASEAN countries, Malaysia is the only one that shares a common border with the rest of this ertswhile regional grouping. This fact translates as one that has plagued the country's bilateral relations and at the same time has meant transnational disputes that appear to be endemic/less tractable in problem-solving; thus, there / and is the Sabah claim, the inseparability of issues between Malaysia and Singapore, fishing problems with Thailand, competing territorial claims between Malaysia and Brunei. In relations with Indonesia, there is always the problem of Jakarta big-brotherism. At the same time, however, there appears less likelihood of conflict between Malaysia and its ASEAN neighbours since the advent of this regional grouping.

Up to 1980, Saravanamuttu traced four distinct phases of Malaysian foreign policy namely:-

1957 - 1963 : The Dilemma of Independence

1964-9 : Confrontation, Turmoil and Change

1970-5 : New Directions Under a New Order

1976-80 : The Consolidation of Policy.(4)

If "idiosyncretic" sources are important, it could further be seen that only two broad phases are important, namely from independence up to 1970-71, and from 1970 to 1980-81. After 1980-81, a third phase could be categorized which coincides with the emergence of prime minister Dato Seri Dr Mahathir and continuing to the present. Up to 1970-71, this was the period of the country under the stewardship of the first prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, wherein its foreign policy for the most part has been described as that of a "committed neutral."(5) After the Tunku, new directions in foreign policy evolved under his successor, the late Tun Abdul Razak, and which was more or less consolidated by the third prime minister Tun Hussein Onn.

The divide between policy before 1970 and after may be seen as one of weaning away from a dependence on the former British colonial authority toward a greater self-reliance and more independent posture in external affairs. It could be added as well that was also the year in which British military withdrawal east of Suez was a certainty that could not be reversed. Nevertheless, in the early years of independence, Saravanamuttu thematizes on the "dilemma" of "choosing a truly independent foreign policy and, at the same time, of being dependent on Britain and other Western powers in the security and economic issue-areas."(6) A lot of this ~~lead~~ had much to do with the Tunku, who, in any event, was also the Foreign Minister, except for a very brief period betwen 1959-60.(7)

It could be said that during the tenure of the Tunku, Malaysia underwent rather eventful changes: independence in 1957 with an ongoing communist insurrection (which still continues, albeit contained); the merger of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah (formerly North Borneo) and Sarawak to form Malaysia in 1963; the "confrontation" from Indonesia against the new federation from 1963 to 1966; and tthe racial riots of May 13, 1969 which led to a new basis in the country's domestic political order.

The last two events, especially, set the tone for change with the stepping down of the Tunku in 1970. Under his successor Tun Razak, Malaysia began to consolidate its relationship in the Southeast Asian region, although steps in that direction had begun earlier. But the thrust was more towards non-alignment and in 1971 Kuala Lumpur initiated the proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. As opposed to the earlier period, Malaysia also began to have diplomatic relations with countries such as China, ventured to attract capital from non-British sources and also began to identify itself as a "Muslim nation." Nevertheless, Saravanamuttu viewed these developments as having undergone "little fundamental change", and that "pragmatism seemed to be the order of the day."(8)

With the death of Tun Razak in 1976, his successor Tun Hussein Onn took on what obviously had been an unexpected turn of events. Although Hussein "did not fundamentally affect foreign policy", (9) the circumstance of the political and security environment had been set in train with the collapse of Saigon in 1975 and the apparent, concomitant withdrawl of the United States from Southeast Asia. This situation became even more "dangerous" when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in 1978, since the spectre of a Vietnamese bilizkrieg through Southeast Asia was made more apparent.

These events, coming so close after the British military withdrawal of 1971, prompted Malaysia to adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with a Southeast Asia whose regional order had obviously altered after 1975. Its effects were to entrench Malaysia's membership in ASEAN as a concernstone of its foreign policy and to enhance its state of military preparedness, essentially to defend itself for any eventuality of a "threat from the North" (read Vietnam). (10) Yet, at the same time, there was an effort to recognize the altered regional situation, although the view in Wisma Putra (Malaysia's foreign policy establishment) was that it was not proper nor desirable to have the reality of a "2-bloc" (ASEAN and Indo China) Southeast Asia.(11)

But rather than allow for a situation in which tensions might result in military conflict, the emphasis on ASEAN as a mechanism for political unity within the regional became Malaysia's priorities: "peace feelers" were extended to Hanoi before the 1978 Kampucheon invasion, and Kuala Lumpur was the venue of the second summit after its first at Bali in 1976. Malaysia also subsequently became an important supporter of the ASEAN effort to undergird the regime forced out by invasion and occupation, the tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)

In 1981, Tun Hussein stepped down and was replaced by the dynamic and innovative Data Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad. His accession to power, however, has meant that the locus of foreign policy decision-making has effectively shifted from Wisma Putra to the Prime Minister's office. In contrast to the earlier period of a steady evolution of foreign policy concerns from a pro-Western stance to a non-aligned position and strong belief in regional co-operation, befitting the well-defined concerns of a small, developing country, Malaysia in the 1980s is evincing an

apparent desire to excercise a leadership role, especially as spokesman for the 'South' countries. Under Dr Mahathir, the foreign policy establishment has been enjoined to go beyond its traditional diplomatic role by helping to 'sell' Malaysia (as a country worthy of investing in and trading with), and Malaysia has been at the forefront in calls for making Antarctica a heritage of Mankind and therefore not bound by the 1959 Treaty, promoting 'South-South' linkages, Islamic unity, condemning apartheid, and in calling for less protectionism in trade in the 'developed' countries. At the same time, however, Mahathir's government continued to solicit investment from the advanced nations even as the West was berated for its 'outdated' (or orientalist) views of the 'developing world.' (12)

The latter position seemed to imply a posture that placed Western countries secondary to East Asian countries, principally Japan and South Korea (and to a lesser extent, Taiwan), in line with Dr Mahathir's exhortation to his countrymen to "Look East". There was much belief, for example, that this was symbolized by the "Buy British last" policy in terms of government purchases of imported material. Subsequent announcements, however, have been made to indicate that Malaysia looked to both East and West, and this was apparently the theme of Dr Mahathir's official visit to Great Britain in July of 1987. None the less, pronouncements that have been made, with the concomitant innuendoes, of the weaknesses of the Commonwealth grouping, Britain's reluctance to apply sanctions on South Africa, and the thesis of a "Jewish conspiracy" within the Western media imply a rather anti-West approach in foreign policy. Also, there has been an apparent turning away from the capitalist West in the search of non-traditional markets for goods and services, a posture abetted by the protectionist tendency in the developed countries and their decline

in purchases of commodities (matched by the lower prices in these items because of a drop in demand). One indication of this was the reported intent of purchase of Soviet heavy-lift helicopters for the Royal Malaysian Air Force in 1984, (13) a decision that has not been implemented apparently because of a lack of funds.(14)

An important facet of today's international relations is the attempt to interrelate the politics and economics of foreign policy. One empirical indication of this is the high trade dependence of Malaysia's manufacturing export performance; by 1970, too, it had achieved the distinction of being /of the twenty top producers of manufactured goods. /one Nonetheless, the Malaysian economy is also vulnerable to trade fluctuations and the vicissitudes of the market in primary products. If anything, Dr Mahathir must be credited for bringing this focus as policy, a shift away from the traditional concerns of diplomacy. On the other hand, it is not clear if the marriage between economic and political emphases is easily managed or leads to a satisfactory melange. The danger is that a feeling of trade dependency (especially from the developed countries) may lead to a more inward-looking industrialization strategy such as import substitution.

One important indication of the difficulty of this mix is the policy on China. While the PRC is recognized as the 'one China', links continue to be maintained with Taiwan a part of the 'Look East' policy and the imperative of economics. This paradox is/ indication of the / an curious blend between political and economic considerations.

While Malaysia continues to rely on its membership in ASEAN as a cornerstone in its foreign policy, it cannot be denied that Mahathir's thinking does not preclude an 'independent' line that may be contrary to agreed objectives - thus on ASEAN-Pacific Co-Operation (or 'APC') in

Human Resources Development (HRD), it has cautioned against a quickening in such a direction.(15) Against larger issues of defence and security, Malaysia has moved to a higher plane of self-reliance against the possibility of aggression from without and clearly does not aim to rely as much as heretofore on more diplomtic-type mechanisms in conflict-resolution.(16)

On the whole, in the period of the 1980s, it could be saiid that Malaysia's foreign policy, largely under the impact of its chief executive, has adopted a more 'nationalistic' stance even as it sought to identify itself as part and parcel of the international environment on various chosen groupings and forums. One might surmise as well a 'leadership of the Third World' posture, not only through some of the iconoclastic initiatives unleased by Dr Mahathir, but also the recent effort of Malaysia to be elected chairman of the UN-sponsored world conference on the battle against the illegal use of drugs and drug trafficking. The emphasis on trade is related to Malaysia's quest for industrialization and its ambition to be an economically developed nation, a notion perhaps of 'having arrived' in the international arena. A more nationalistic orientation, as espoused, denotes an independent position in world affairs, but may well reflect Dr Mahathir's view that Malaysia of the past had been closer to the West, and as such needs to be steered more to the centre. This nationalistic orientation, as well, is indicated by a domestic desire of the ruling Malay elite to be 'more Muslim', and Malaysia to be seen in international affairs as an 'Islamic state'.

The Future

If the foregoing review of Malaysian policy is any guide to the future directions of Malaysia's external relations, it is simply that the impetus for foreign policy is largely dependent on ruling elite perceptions and the given factors of Malaysia's position and environment. Saravanamuttu, as has already been shown, has indicated this as the 'idiosyncretic' and 'eco-historical' factors of foreign policy analysis.

To this might be added his schemata of the goals of foreign policy, namely:(17)

| | |
|---|---|
| Defence and Security | Core-value goals |
| Development and Trade | Possession goals |
| International Co-Operation and Diplomacy | Milieu goals |

Inasmuch as Malaysian policy-making is largely a ruling elite process, it could be expected that the function of the former would be dependent on whether Malaysia's political structure would be altered. For the moment, it can however be concluded that no changes seem probable, and that the existing Barisan Nasional coalition government would continue to be in power.

The question, then, relates to the pre-eminence of the prime minister as the country's chief executive in the foreign policy process. This circumstance is not likely to change, either, because of the strong powers accorded the chief executive, irrespective of whether the prime minister also holds the foreign minister's portfolio. In cases where the prime minister is not concurrently the foreign minister, it always held that the former's impact would anyway be supreme in the cabinet form of government in force. However, this may be a debateable thesis in one instance in the past when Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie held that post, or if not, was otherwise assumed to wield considerable influence in the government.(18)

Who would be the prime minister in future decades is, then, a central issue in terms of foreign policy direction. As in all ASEAN countries, Malaysia is no exception in terms of the transition to "second-generation" elites. The process of the change-over can be expected to be fairly smooth in that the procedures are already institutionalized, but over the last two years it is apparent that infighting within the ruling elite has emerged as a feature. In the last party elections of the dominant United Malays National Orgganization (UMNO) of the ruling Barisan Nasional, two factions 'Team A' and 'Team B' - vied

for control of the party. What is uncertain is what the alternative elites would have done in terms of foreign policy, although it is apparent 'Team B' would have reversed Dr Mahathir's policies, if his side had lost.

If parochialization in domestic politics does not lend easily to a better understanding for the need to be part of the international system, future foreign policy may be a rough road to traverse. One example will suffice to indicate the difficulty at reconciling pragmatism and idealism: an emphasis on tourism as is presently the case in order to earn foriegn exchange as part of economic development also means the need for "openness" to draw the tourist traffic. But that influx may easily lead to the dissemination of "Western" values and habits that will be seen as negative. Thus, certain domestic policies will not easily interface with the trend at parochialization. It is even questionable if there is inherent understanding of the need to be competitive internationally or face the alternative of losing the race to get what they've (the developed countries) got.

Among the "second generation elites", it can be expected that they process a "less Western" orientation and several in their ranks exhibit an Islamicist stand. On the other hand, it could also be that their elevation to national power would allow them to be more liberal and open in their approach to leadership of a Malay-dominant, multi-racial society.(19) Although there has been a conscious attempt at absorbing "Islamic values" in the administration and society, those in power or have been the leading Islamicists in UMNO seem to also advocate a tempering of this approach with the realities of the national and international situations. Nonetheless, it is not clear if the notion of an "Islamic state" would mean Malaysia might relegate its role in ASEAN to a secondary position should these elites

come to power. But it does mean that Malaysia's solidarity with the Arab states against Israel is a firm stand. Apart from orientation, it will also depend on how the competition to be "more Islamic' within UMNO is resolved.

There does not seem to be any likelihood that the pattern of authority in Malaysia will be replaced whereupon civilian authority will become subservient to a military regime. As long as there is overall political stability, civilian dominance in politics will continue unbated. This will mean essentially control by the politicians and the bureaucracy. But civilian control would also be dependent on the state of the economy and how Malaysia fares in its efforts to modernize and industrialize. What has become worrisome is Malaysia's ability to perform as a producer of commodities and as a manufacturer of industrial goods. Global economic recession and contraction of the international trading system, coupled with a protectionist mood in the developed societies in the 1980s has made Malaysia's ability to sustain economic development tenuous. This has domestic implications, for the ruling government has comitted itself to a "restructuring" process through its "New Economic Policy"; this program is based on a "constant growth" economy. Some observers think that the high growth rates that were a highlight of the economy in the 1970s, and which in turn fuelled an expanded economy, are now a thing of the past.

These developments, indeed, have formed the basis of opposition and criticism of Dr Mahathir's external policies in the last few years. However, as Dr Mahathir's position has remained intact in spite of being assailed, it is to be expected that the prerogative of the chief executive remains an exclusive domain in the direction and execution of foreign policy. The problem, in part, in analyzing this state of affairs is that there is apparent contradiction between rhetoric and action. As mich as the West is

lambasted, so is there a relentless search for their investment and a source of Malaysia's exports. Similarly, even as China was termed as a "long-term threat", it has not precluded an attempt to establish better trading links with Beijing, with Dr Mahathir himself having led an official delegation (including a big number of businessmen) to the People's Republic in November, 1985.

It could of course be that there is a real separation between domestic politics and foreign policy in that the latter do not constitute salient and overt issues in the political process. In a system in which the ruling party controls two-thirds of its legislative assembly, in which there is a strong paternalistic leadership, and in which the dominance of top elite views are less open to criticism, there is indeed little room for dissension in the decision-making arena, especially in the foreign policy domain.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

If those who rule and the organization of the governmental machinery is fused in any polity, it could be expected that decision-making is a tightly-controlled and compact process and that open debate of policy is less likely to occur. At independence in 1957 and the ensuing two decades or so of postindependence, in the linkage between the foreign policy establishment (Wisma Putra) and their "political masters" (a term used by the former to refer to the latter) there at least existed the myth of a close working relationship between those who decide and those who implement. In addition, one can note that the bases of foreign policy were subject to scrutiny by those elected to serve, that is, the legislative branch of government. Under the first three prime ministers, especially the first, there was at least the semblance of a diffuse pattern of authority; the record of parliamentary debate during the time of the Tunku testifies to the

debate allowed on foreign policy that had been chosen. The role of the "foreign ministry boys" as advisors and implementators, or otherwise as the "fourth estate", was highly regarded by the politicians in power, in effect a recognition of the former's professionalism.

The period from 1981 to the present, however, represents a departure from the established working relationship, and indeed one notes a strong tendency to fuse the authority of government within the highest political office in the land, and to centralize or concentrate the decision-making to one or a limited few. In such a situation, even an inveterate public bureaucracy as the Malaysian Civil Service, of which Wisma Putra officials are a part of, has not been spared the curtailment of its previous domains of power. Under such circumstances, that initiatives in foreign policy would appear to have come directly from the highest political authority would be an understandable development, but in its train one could argue as well has meant the demise of traditional diplomacy or at least its relegation to a secondary status. What this entails in terms of future foreign policy is anyone's guess, but the newer elites who will assume political power in due course will most likely not be schooled in the distinctions between that power and the authority of the civil service in systems based on the British parliamentary model. In addition, after 1981, there has been less opportunity for review of foreign policy by those in the legislature.

Nonetheless, insofar as bureaucracies are conservative forces, it is not likely that drastic changes will occur as to their functioning, even as foreign policy takes on new directions. But, it is more than likely that the foreign policy establishment will take on a more indigenous character than the Westernised version it had been at its inception.

As a developing country with a strong modernization impetus in the form of industrialization, Malaysia's interests cannot fail to be viewed in the context of economic interdependence and the quest for political influence by other parties. This setting, however, is very much subject to interpretation by its leadership whose independence in furthering Malaysia's interests has become more personalized rather than institutionally processed. Change is inevitable, but how change is then analyzed for policy direction in the external arena may not be an exactly rational exercise. If moderation in the past had been a key of Malaysian political stability, one can, however, expect for a continuation of its basic foreign policy objectives. In the final analysis, this may boil down to a question of the security, preservation and survival of the Malaysian nation-state. As the only country that shares common borders with all its ASEAN fellow member-states, this may be the primary consideration of its given condition for the future.

If this analysis is correct, it will mean that, like it or not, foreign policy formulation must take note of a primary and unavoidable consideration, namely that of security against a predatory international environment. In the attempt to be less identified with the West, Malaysia may well have plunged into the difficult sea of power rivalry that is a basis of international politics. In an earlier period, a policy of equdistance was an important facet, but a changed international environment must reorientate Malaysia to strategic concerns - to wit, the decline of Pax Americana, a quandrangular power relationship in the Asia-Pacific (the US, USSR, China and Japan) and the prospect of Vietnamese hegemony and the emergence of Indonesia as the 'middle power' in Southeast Asia.

What, therefore, is the path that Malaysia as an advanced Third World country must adopt to pursue a policy that is pragmatic?

Footnotes

1. For an excellent analysis of Islam in international relations, see James Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge : Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1986).

2. For an earlier analysis of this challenge, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad "Evolution and Development of the Political System in Malaysia", in R. Scalapino, et. al., eds., Asian Political Institutionalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 1986), pp. 221 - 240.

3. Savaranamuttu, "Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1957 - 80", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad, ed., Government and Politics of Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 130. See also his The Dilemma of Independence, Two decades of Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1957 - 1977 (Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1983).

4. Saravanamuthu in Zakaria, p. 131

5. R. Tilman, "Malaysian Foreign Polciy: The Dilemmas of a Committed Neutral", in John Montgomery and A. Hirschman, eds., Public Policy, Vol. 16 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 115 - 159.

6. Saravanamuttu in Zakaria, p. 131

7. The Tunku's role in forging the thrust of Malaysian foreign policy is unabashedly explored in Dato' Abdullah Ahmad's Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963 - 1970 (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing Sdn. Bhd., 1985).

8. Saravanamuttu in Zakaria, p. 147.

9. Ibid.

10. Thus, in writing the annual country report for Malaysia in 1979, Hans Indorf was to title it "Malaysia in 1979: A Preoccupation with Security", Asian Survey, Vol. XX:2 (February, 1980), pp. 135 - 43.

11. Interview with a senior Wisma Putra official.

12. Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Postscript", in Zakaria, ed., Op. Cit., p. 164

13. Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia in 1984: No More Free Lunches", Asian Survey, 24:2 (February, 1984), pp. 206 - 213.

14. Kerry Fong, "Rithauddeen: We may still buy Soviet weapons", The Star (Malaysia), July 26, 1987.

15. Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "ASEAN-Pacific Co-operation: The Long Way Ahead", Asia Pacific Community, Vol. 30, 1985, pp. 13-29.

16. Zakaria, "Postscript", pp. 164 - 165.

17. Op. Cit., p. 129

18. This may have been the hidden theme of Dato Abdullah Ahmad's book, Op. Cit.,. Some observers believe it was written to denigrate Ghazali Shafie's role in Malaysian foreign policy, in part motivated by Dato Abdullah's desire to hit back at the man who had jailed him in 1976.

19. For a discussion of these dynamics, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "STability, Security and National Development in Malaysia: An Appraisal", in Kusuma Snitwongse and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, eds, Durable Stability in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Regional Strategic Studies programme, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 117 - 136.